State Immunity from Execution in the Collection of Awards Rendered in International Investment Arbitration: The Achilles' Heel of the Investor-State Arbitration System? - ARIA - Vol. 26, No. 1
Author(s):
Olga Gerlich
Page Count:
54 pages
Media Description:
1 PDF Download
Published:
July, 2015
Description:
Originally from American Review of International Arbitration - ARIA
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2014 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rendered three
awards in the investment arbitration against the Russian government brought by
the shareholders of Yukos, once Russia’s largest oil and gas company, under the
Energy Charter Treaty.1 The compensation granted for expropriation of the
investor’s assets makes them the largest awards in the history of investment
arbitration.2 However, as indicated by commentators, the Russian Federation is
unlikely to voluntarily comply with these awards.3 The remedy available to the
investors against Russia’s non-compliance, namely the forcible execution of the
compensation awarded in third states, will be barred in the case of most of the
Russian assets by virtue of the principle of state immunity from execution.
Another case concerning Russia illustrates well the potential problems
regarding state immunity pleas in the execution of investment awards. Sedelmeyer
was the sole owner of a company dedicated to the training of police and security
personnel which entered into a joint venture with the Leningrad police department
in 1991. Following expropriation of his capital contribution in the joint venture,
Sedelmayer initiated arbitration under the Germany-Russia bilateral investment
treaty (“BIT”) at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. In 1998 the tribunal
rendered an award in his favor, ordering Russia to pay $2.35 million, plus
interest.4 It took Mr. Sedelmayer 12 years and over 30 domestic execution cases to
collect part of the award compensation. During that time Russia successfully
evaded paying the awarded compensation by raising its state immunity from
execution before national courts.5
At the international law level, the enforcement of international investment
arbitration awards is governed by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”)6
and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (“New York Convention”).7 The first applies to awards rendered in
accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules,8 the latter to awards rendered under
other arbitration rules, including the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.9 In the light of the rather successful history of
compliance with investment awards,10 the limitations to these collection
mechanisms are yet to be fully explored in practice. Nonetheless, the examples of
recalcitrant states like Russia and Argentina11 reveal some serious deficiencies in the
investor-state arbitration system which this article aims to analyze. Investors
challenged by recalcitrant states are frequently forced to collect their compensation
award in jurisdictions other than the respondent state. However, there they
encounter a significant legal obstacle, namely state immunity from execution.12