Originally from American Review of International Arbitration - ARIA

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 I. INTRODUCTION
No other area of the World Trade Organization (WTO)1 has received more attention than its Dispute Settlement procedures, arguably the most important systemic outcome of the Uruguay Round.2 This is not surprising from the perspective of the WTO itself. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)3 was, it is argued,4 part of a Marrakech “historical deal”—fundamental to the entire outcome of the Uruguay Round. Moreover, the provisions for multilateral dispute resolution are horizontal in nature, extending to all dimensions of the covered agreements. It is not surprising, too, from the perspective of the academic community of WTO watchers: it is becoming increasingly difficult (though some still make the claim) to be a true specialist in all areas of substantive law covered by the agreements. But everyone interested in the WTO is a supposed specialist on dispute settlement – and this includes the sprinkling of political scientists who have come to appreciate the profound importance of the WTO, the many economists and political economists who have appreciated it for years and the rapidly growing number of trade lawyers (many of whom have sniffed the color of money6). The five-year official Review7 of he process, one of the many casualties of Seattle, brought all this attention into sharp focus.8