Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution - WAMR 2013 Vol. 7, No. 1
Jan Paulsson holds the Michael Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair at the University of Miami School of Law. He has acted as counsel or arbitrator in many hundreds of international arbitrations, conducted under all the major international arbitration rules. He has appeared before a number of public international law tribunals, including the International Court of Justice. Jan is President of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, President of the Administrative Tribunals of the OECD and the EBRD, and a board member of the AAA. He is a former President of the London Court of International Arbitration and of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal, and a former Vice-President of the ICC International Court of Arbitration. Jan heads a graduate programme in international arbitration at the School of Law of the University of Miami. Among his publications are the standard reference work International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edition 2000), which he co-authored with Messrs. W.L. Craig and W.W. Park, and his monograph Denial of Justice in International Law, published by Cambridge University Press in 2005. His latest book, The Idea of Arbitration, will be published by Oxford University Press in 2013. Jan holds degrees from Harvard College, Yale Law School (where he was an editor of the Yale Law Journal) and the University of Paris. He speaks English, French, Spanish, and Swedish. He may be contacted at jpaulsson@law.miami.edu.
Originally from World Arbitration And Mediation Review (WAMR)
Two years ago, Bernard Oxman delivered his extraordinary Hausler Chair Lecture on “The United States and the Future of International Law.” He was deeply concerned with the fact that, as he so eloquently put it, “the constituent elements of the international legal system, and our engagement with that system, are more fragile than many of us would prefer to believe.”1 He invited us to perceive international law as “a resource to be used to further substantive objectives by endowing certain propositions with legitimacy and a sense of obligation.”2
Professor Oxman was viewing our world from the perspective of the legal eagle that he is. What you hear from me today is intended to be a call to improve one element of the system so that our common objectives can be more effectively pursued because our institutions are legitimate.
An unfavorable decision is unlikely to be accepted as legitimate if it is perceived to be the product of arbitrariness or bias. Let us consider the implications of this observation for the international community.