Iura Novit Curia in International Law - European International Arbitration Review (EIAR) - Volume 6 - Issue 1

Dr. Friedrich Rosenfeld is Partner with the arbitration boutique Hanefeld Rechtsanwälte in Hamburg, Germany. He is also Global Adjunct Professor at NYU Law in Paris, Visiting Professor at the International Hellenic University in Thessaloniki and Lecturer at Bucerius Law School. The author would like to thank Mary Grace White for her most valuable assistance in editing the article. The standard disclaimers apply.

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Originally from European International Arbitration Review

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I. Introduction

Iura novit curia, commonly translated as “the judge knows the law”, is a fundamental principle of legal procedure. An early reference to this maxim appears already in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Reflecting upon the multiple uses of rhetoric, Aristotle argued:

It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity - one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.

Aristotle hence advocated a system in which the role of the parties was limited to adducing the relevant facts, while it was incumbent upon the judge to make his own legal assessment. A similar allocation of responsibilities between parties and judges emerged as a legal principle in Roman law. The Latin dictum “da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius” – give me the facts, I will give you the law – reflected this.

Over time, the principle iura novit curia spread among various civil law jurisdictions. This development gained momentum with the increase of legally trained decision-makers across continental Europe.