The Multilateral Bargaining - Section 7 - Collective Bargaining: How it Works and Why - 3rd Edition
Thomas R. Colosi is American Arbitration Association Vice President for National Affairs and a third-party neutral. He spends much of his time training advocates and neutrals about the workings of dispute resolution. He has taught as an adjunct professor for the University of Maryland Law School and at Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations.
Arthur E. Berkeley is Associate Professor at the Memphis State University’s School of Business, where he teaches alternative dispute resolution. He is involved in training programs as well as serving as an arbitrator. He served as the founding president of the Maryland Chapter of Industrial Relations Research Association.
Originally from Collective Bargaining: How it Works and Why - 3rd Edition
IN THIS SECTION we consider bargaining configurations in which more than two parties are involved.
Having examined the bilateral bargaining model and noted some of its inherent complexities, it is now appropriate to begin a consideration of some negotiating models of greater complexity, starting with the trilateral, or three-sided, model.
Although a diagram of the trilateral model may not appear especially intricate at first, such is not the case. In fact, the bargaining configurations discussed earlier—the horizontal, internal and vertical—increase geometrically rather than arithmetically when only one additional party is added. This is demonstrated by Chart 7.
One dramatic differential the trilateral model presents is in the reaching of an agreement by two sides. In the bilateral model, of course, that is the goal of the negotiators, and, should their assistance be sought, they are neutrals as well. However, in the trilateral model, if two parties reach agreement, it may threaten the interests of the third party, as seen in Chart 8.
Points to Ponder