Originally from The Law and Practice of International Arbitration: Essays in Honor of John Fellas – Preview Page

1. INTRODUCTION 

Arbitral institutions play a crucial part in driving the legitimacy and popularity of international arbitration.2 The functions that arbitral institutions discharge have evolved over time. These range from administrative (such coordinating the costs of an arbitration) to substantive (such as deciding the commencement date of an arbitration that could go to issues of limitation). This prompts the question: Who watches over arbitral institutions, and where might a party aggrieved with the actions of an arbitral institution go to seek recourse?   

The recent decision of the Singapore High Court (SGHC) in DMZ v. DNA, [2025] SGHC 31, brings this very issue into focus. In this case, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Registrar revised its original determination of the arbitration commencement date (3 July 2024) to 24 June 2024. This seemingly routine administrative decision saved claims from being time-barred and led to filing of a lawsuit against SIAC.  

Although the SGHC dismissed DMZ’s challenge, its reasoning and findings provide useful insight into Singapore’s approach towards challenges against decisions of arbitral institutions during the pendency of an arbitration. More importantly, this decision helpfully sets the stage to explore crucial questions such as are institutions merely contractual service providers, answerable like any private counterparty for breach of duty? Does the public law remedy of judicial review lie when an institution exercises a statutory power? How effective, in reality, are the widely drafted waiver clauses that purport to bar appeals to national courts? And if direct court proceedings are unlikely to succeed, can parties still obtain relief indirectly by persuading an arbitral tribunal to revisit the institution’s ruling?