Two to Tango: Domestic Grounds for Vacatur Under the New York Convention - Chapter 08 - International Arbitration and the Courts
Author(s):
Harout Jack Samra
Page Count:
32 pages
Media Description:
1 PDF Download
Published:
September, 2015
Description:
Originally from International Arbitration and the Courts
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, international arbitration has provided ample
fodder for mystifying Supreme Court rulings and rampant divisions among
the circuit courts. These divisions, some seemingly irreconcilable, are
deeply troublesome as they lead to the sort of venue or choice-of-law
gamesmanship that plagues litigation. From the viability of the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the law in light of the Supreme Court’s command in
Hall Street v. Mattel,1 to the more fundamental question of whether the
grounds for vacatur enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act2 (the “FAA”
or the “Act”) are available at all, selecting the locus of an arbitration has
acquired even greater, more far-reaching significance than it previously
possessed, as that selection may bear directly on which defenses against an
adverse award are available. These factors are particularly true in the
context of international arbitration, which is also directed by the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).3 This article will address
this last concern in particular.
In international arbitration, several circuit courts have diverged
rather drastically as to what bases are available for vacating arbitration
awards. This confusion, largely rooted in the challenge of reconciling
the New York Convention and the FAA, strikes at the core of the
essential balance that must be maintained in order for arbitration to
remain a viable tool for dispute resolution: the balance between the
finality of the award and the procedural safeguards provided to parties
who, quite literally, get less than what they bargained for.4 Several
courts have wrestled with this question and reached, at least on the
surface, differing conclusions. Nevertheless, upon close analysis, a
compelling argument can be made that these two schemes are not in
any way inconsistent, but rather complementary. In Yusuf Ahmed
Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, 5 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals engaged in such analysis and reached that very conclusion.
The state of the law in the other circuits is in a greater degree of flux.
While based on a broad reading, one might conclude that the Eleventh
Circuit, in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte,6
addressed this issue and reached the opposite conclusion from the
Second Circuit. As we shall discuss, infra, the Eleventh Circuit’s
rationale is glaringly incomplete, as it fails to address Article V(1)(e)
of the New York Convention, through which the Second Circuit
incorporated domestic grounds.
As the title of this article suggests, “it takes two to tango” insofar as
consideration of motions to vacate an international arbitration award
rendered in several specific circumstances must be made by employing
the FAA and the New York Convention in tandem, each supporting the
other. To this end, I will first address each of the schemes in turn,
followed by a discussion of the manner in which they have been applied