This opinion addresses issues of jurisdiction and procedure presented by this case. The plaintiff, Huntsman Corporation (“Huntsman”), sued International Risk Insurance Company (“IRIC”) in state court in Beaumont, Texas, alleging breach of contract and anticipatory breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment that IRIC is obligated to pay the damages Huntsman sustained in a fire in its East Texas plant. (Docket Entry. No. 1, Ex. A-1). IRIC filed a third-party petition against the Reinsurers.1 (Docket Entry No. 1-6 at 1–2).2 IRIC sought a declaratory judgment that the Reinsurers must accept IRIC’s tender of the defense of Huntsman’s claims. (Id. at ¶¶ 34–36). IRIC also sought a declaratory judgment that if the Reinsurers refused to accept the defense, they were liable for the damages IRIC incurred in its litigation with Huntsman. (Id. at ¶ 37). In the alternative, IRIC asked the court to compel the Reinsurers to arbitrate whether IRIC had to accept the defense of Huntsman’s claims. (Id. at ¶ 38).

Certain Reinsurers removed to the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division on January 14, 2008.3 (Docket Entry No. 1). In the removal notice, the Reinsurers asserted that because “arbitration agreements between citizens of foreign countries and citizens of the United States are implicated,” federal-question jurisdiction exists under the New York Convention (9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.) and the Panama Convention (9 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.). (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 24). The Reinsurers also asserted that “[d]iversity jurisdiction is appropriate after the parties are realigned to reflect their true interests in the lawsuit.” (Id. at ¶ 30).

Huntsman timely moved to remand. Huntsman argued that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because realignment of the parties was not appropriate. (Docket Entry No. 13 at 1). As to federal-question jurisdiction, Huntsman argued that the Reinsurers failed to meet the removal requirements under the federal arbitration statutes. (Id.). Huntsman contended that even if removal was appropriate, this court should use its discretion to remand because statelaw claims against IRIC predominate. (Id.). Finally, Huntsman argued that the Reinsurers had waived their right to object to remand. (Id.).

Two days after Huntsman moved to remand, the Reinsurers moved to transfer venue from the Eastern District to the Southern District of Texas, based on the “first-to-file” rule. (Docket Entry No. 28 at 1–2). That motion was granted. (Docket Entry Nos. 59–61). The motion to remand remained pending.

Based on careful consideration of the motion in light of the pleadings, the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, this court denies remand. The reasons are explained in detail below.