Moral damage is an elusive concept. It can be defined, in its broadest sense, as the opposite of a material damage resulting in an economic loss. The Lusitania tribunal defined the concept as an “injury inflicted resulting in mental suffering, injury to his feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position or injury to his credit or reputation.”1 The Commentary to the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State responsibility provides the following illustration of the type of moral damage to an individual that can be compensated: “Non-material damage is generally understood to encompass loss of loved ones, pain and suffering as well as the affront to sensibilities associated with an intrusion on the person, home or private life.”2 One author, Wittich, has recently proposed a more detailed definition:
First, it includes personal injury that does not produce loss of income or generate financial expenses. Secondly, it comprises the various forms of emotional harm, such as indignity, humiliation, shame, defamation, injury to reputation and feelings, but also harm resulting from the loss of loved ones and, on a more general basis, from the loss of enjoyment of life.