Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. On leave 1967-1968 and serving as Professor in Residence, Staff of Member Sam Zagoria, N.L.R.B. The basic work on this paper was carried out under a Summer Research Fellowship issued by the Kentucky Research Foundation, University of Kentucky, for which the author is grateful. The author wishes to thank Mr. John Bryant and Mr. James Waitman for their able assistance at various phases in the preparation of this article. The views and contents of this article are the author's and not necessarily those of any of the above individuals or institutions.
Kentucky's recognition of the utility of the arbitration process has been evident since the adoption of the Commonwealth's second Constitution in 1799. This Charter expressly provided:
It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass such laws as shall be necessary and proper to decide differences by arbitrators, to be appointed by the parties who may choose that summary mode of adjustment.
The courts of the Commonwealth, consistent with that provision, have long declared that it is the policy of the law to favor the settlement of disputes by means of arbitration.
Nevertheless, Kentucky's statutory provisions authorizing and facilitating arbitration have not kept abreast of modem refinements in the use of arbitration machinery and the enforcement of arbitration awards.