Originally from World Arbitration And Mediation Review (WAMR)

Preview Page

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
Mesdames, gentlemen, it is a privilege for me to be here with
you today as part of this prestigious faculty of speakers and, in
particular, to share this panel with Professor Alvarez. We have
collectively been presented with a very challenging task. The
sovereign debt crisis experienced by Argentina over a decade ago
has given rise to serious questions concerning the adequacy of the
institutions and norms that govern the resolution of international
investment disputes, to address disputes such as those that have
arisen from Argentina’s management of its financial crisis. These
questions are all the more urgent in our present global financial
climate. Indeed, the financial woes that most Western States have
experienced over the past several years are far from over. I am
thinking, in particular, of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and
Italy, each one of which may act to stabilize its economy, cause
damage to international investors and add to ICSID’s docket. The
past is therefore prologue, and the implications of our “stocktaking”
exercise today are potentially more far-reaching than the
Argentina cases.
My colleagues “laid the brickwork” earlier this morning for
our discussion of the Argentine cases and their handling within
the ICSID system, with an exposition of several arbitral
mechanisms employed over the past century to manage economic
and political disruptions. That exposition, not surprisingly,
anticipated some of the issues that I propose to address in my
comments to you regarding “institutional aspects” of this approach
to managing economic and political disruption to the international
legal order. The success or failure of the international arbitral
system and, in particular, ICSID, in managing disputes arising from
Argentina’s handling of its sovereign debt crisis cannot be fully