Introduction 

From the outset, I would like to point out that the present Dissenting Opinion does not 1.have the objective of dealing with the effect of most-favoured-nation (hereinafter “MFN”) clauses on investment arbitration provisions of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), and more specifically their effect on dispute settlement provisions. The applicable treaty in casu – the 1995 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Turkmenistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (hereinafter, the “U.K.-Turkmenistan BIT”) – deals explicitly with this issue. 

My Dissenting Opinion deals with the Respondent’s first objection to jurisdiction in the 2.present case, i.e. the objection for lack of consent. Throughout the jurisdictional phase and during exchanges with my esteemed colleagues, I have always kept in mind the need to preserve the exact balance of rights and obligations negotiated in the U.K.-Turkmenistan BIT. Such a concern stems from the desire to ensure that the rights and legal interests of both disputing parties are unaltered.1