Originally from The Law and Practice of International Arbitration: Essays in Honor of John Fellas – Preview Page

1. INTRODUCTION 

Arbitration is grounded in party autonomy: parties choose to remove their dispute from state courts and to design the process that will bind them. Post-award control serves two legitimate functions: (i) to protect the parties’ private interests by verifying compliance with their arbitration agreement, and (ii) to safeguard public policy from the effects of the award where it may implicate public interests. The threshold question is which State’s public policy is relevant at each procedural stage. Party autonomy would be limitless if not for public interests. Thus, limits are justified only where they rest on a coherent rationale. This essay contends that the current control scheme, as applied, too readily empowers the seat’s public policy at the expense of the parties’ bargain. Additionally, it proposes a recalibration that preserves legitimate public-policy review at the enforcement stage while maximizing party autonomy. 

The existing framework relies on two mechanisms: the set-aside at the seat of arbitration and the recognition and enforcement at the place of enforcement. Both can, under certain readings, unduly limit the effect of the parties’ choices. Those limits are not inevitable: within the New York Convention, courts already possess discretion to interpret and apply the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement. Properly exercised, that discretion balances public interests without eroding the autonomy that defines international arbitration.