Originially from: World Arbitration and Mediation Review (WAMR)

A Critique of the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) (Part One)
In early August 2000—at its annual conference held in St. Augustine,
Florida, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) “approved and recommended for enactment in all the states” the
Uniform Arbitration Act (2000). The vote was nearly unanimous (Alabama
abstained and the Michigan and Rhode Island state delegations were absent). The
Uniform Arbitration Act was originally adopted in 1955 and had not been revised
since 1956. The work of modernizing the legislation was begun three years ago
by a NCCUSL drafting committee. The need for revisions was spurred by the
rapid pace and the sometimes dramatic character of developments in the field of
arbitration. The increased scope of application for the arbitral process and the
greater sophistication of arbitral doctrine demanded a new and more adapted
uniform legislative framework.
As enacted, the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) contains a number of
provisions that incorporate the principles and concepts that have emerged from
and have been developed in the contemporary case law on arbitration. In the final
analysis, however, it is not a luminary statute, ready-made for incorporation into
existing statutory law. The 1955 version of the uniform law had been such a
document. It represented a substantial improvement over the narrow procedural
focus of the Federal Arbitration Act and functioned as a fully comprehensive
statement of arbitral regulatory principles. The successor act, however, is simply
not in the same league of regulatory enactments. The new uniform law suffers
from problems of language. Simply and pointedly stated, it is poorly drafted. Not
only are many of its provision inelegantly rendered, but the inadequacies of
language also give rise to problematic ambiguities and general perplexity about
the rule that is being propounded. In addition, the drafting committee appears to
have addressed a number of controversial developments in the law simply by
taking a side on the question. This approach is likely to be controversial and it is
unlikely to foster the type of balanced consideration that is necessary to elaborate
a credible characterization of the basic content of the existing law. By
overstepping the bounds of its authority, the drafting committee compromised the
persuasiveness of its recommendations and the objectives of its mission.
Section 6 of the RUAA, entitled “Validity of Agreement to Arbitrate,”
addresses the question of jurisdiction to rule on matters of arbitrability. It
provides as follows:
(a) An agreement contained in a record to submit
to arbitration any existing or subsequent
controversy arising between the parties to the