Instructor, Department of Business Administration, University of Wyoming. The author expresses appreciation to Professor Thomas A. Kochan of Cornell University and to Dean David B. Johnson of the University of Wisconsin for assistance in this work.
The collective bargaining literature is replete with writings expressing the view that the prospect of compulsory arbitration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement "chills" bargaining.' Arguments supporting this position are based, either explicitly or implicitly, on the premise that the parties to collective bargaining perceive that an arbitrator will decide the case by compromising between the positions that the parties occupy immediately prior to going to arbitration. A clear and rigorous statement of this premise and the logical consequences of its adoption has been made by Carl M. Stevens. Stevens argues that a perception by the parties that the arbitrator will adopt the decision rule of compromise between the parties' impasse positions will lead them to necessarily forgo bargaining and rely upon arbitration.