C. Short Identification of the Case

1. The short identification below is without prejudice to the Parties’ full presentation of the factual and legal details of this case, and the Tribunal’s considerations and conclusions.

C.I. The Claimants’ Perspective

2. Claimants summarize the main aspects of the dispute at C-I ¶¶ 2 – 24 and C-II ¶¶ 1 - 31, partially quoted and summarized below; CPHB 1 ¶¶ 2 – 42, CPHB 2 ¶¶ 1 – 8:

2. [...] In reliance on Kazakhstan’s solemn commitments under international law, Claimants invested more than US$ 1 billion breathing new life into previously-neglected oil and gas fields, and constructing a state-of-the art LPG Plant that Kazakhstan itself described as having “great regional and industrial importance for development of the region.” But just as those investments matured and began to generate returns, Kazakhstan launched a targeted campaign of intimidation and harassment designed to pressure Claimants into selling their investments to the state-owned oil company at a firesale price. Kazakhstan went so far as to imprison a senior KPM employee on patently bogus criminal charges, and to threaten other employees with the same fate, in furtherance of its strong arm tactics. When its plan failed — because Claimants defiantly refused to give in to Kazakhstan’s pressure — the government simply seized the investments, deciding to take its chances in arbitration.

3. Perhaps most shocking, this plan originated from the highest level of the Kazakhstan government, namely, President Nazarbayev himself. That fact would sound far-fetched if it were not admitted, but Kazakhstan concedes that President Nazarbayev personally issued the order that led to the expropriation of Claimants’ investments.

4. [...] Kazakhstan attempts to shroud its violations of international law in a cloak of legitimacy by focusing on each minute detail in isolation rather than the totality of its conduct as a whole. It argues that its extraordinary campaign of inspections was perfectly normal, and that its subsequent actions were appropriate responses to the information it discovered under arcane, Delphic, and often-misstated provisions of its own domestic law. These arguments, however, crumble under the weight of the evidence. Kazakhstan did not discover any wrongdoing by Claimants’ companies, much less violations that would justify the extraordinary actions that followed. Viewing Kazakhstan’s conduct in its entirety, it is evident that Kazakhstan’s objective from the start was to devalue Claimants’ investments by making it virtually impossible for Claimants to operate or sell the businesses, so that Claimants would sell to Kazakhstan at a firesale price. Moreover, Kazakhstan also anticipated this arbitration from the beginning, and cloaked its actions under mystifying interpretations of domestic laws and regulations in order to create an appearance of normalcy and legitimacy.