The Union's Duty to Process Discrimination Claims - Dispute Resolution Journal - Vol. 32, No. 3
The author is Assistant Professor of Management and Industrial Relations at Northern Illinois University. He is also a member of the Iowa Bar Association.
Originally from Dispute Resolution Journal
Introduction and Background
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver the Supreme Court held that an employee is not precluded from asserting his or her claim of employment discrimination under Title VIP merely because he or she had previously submitted the claim to binding arbitration pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Hence, under the current state of law, an employee who believes that she is the object of discriminatory employment practices may pursue remedies under the labor agreement and simultaneously or subsequently commence a Title VII action with the EEOG or federal courts.
The District Court' in Alexander had held that a policy which gave the employee "two strings" to his bow, while providing the employer with only one, would "sound the death knell for arbitration clauses in labor contracts."* The court felt that "such a result would bring to a tragic end the many years of effort which have brought about the now prevailing arbitration procedures to resolve labor disputes."" Reasoning that this argument mistakes the effect of Title VII, the Supreme Court rejected the philosophy of the lower court. The Court noted that under the Steelworkers' Trilogy,* judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is limited. The employee who institutes an action under the Civil Rights Act is not seeking review of an arbitrator's decision, but is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process.'' Likewise, an employer does not have "two strings to his bow" with respect to an arbitral decision because Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action against employees.'