Price Re-Openers In Long-Term Gas Supply Agreements - Chapter 12 - Leading Practitioners’ Guide to International Oil & Gas Arbitration
Author(s):
Michael Polkinghorne
Sven-Michael Volkmer
Page Count:
34 pages
Media Description:
1 PDF Download
Published:
August, 2015
Description:
Originally from The Leading Practitioners' Guide to International Oil & Gas Arbitration
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we examine price review clauses in long-term gas
sales agreements (GSAs). At their most general level, price review
clauses allow the periodic review and adjustment of price provisions
in GSAs. While variations of such clauses exist around the world, the
focus in recent years has been on Europe. The mature and
competitive US gas market has seen the role of price review clauses
diminish; and the limited competition in Asian gas markets has
fostered stability, giving the bulk of market players little reason to
commence formal price reviews (let alone submit those reviews to
arbitration). Upheavals in European gas markets, by contrast, have
produced a spate of gas price negotiations and arbitrations in recent
years. This chapter draws from this body of price reviews and
focuses on price review clauses as they appear in European GSAs.
The first European GSAs date back to the development of gas
import pipelines in Germany, Belgium, and France in the 1960s.1
Their successor agreements usually share the same basic features,
notably a term of 15-20 years which is often extended. When
concluding GSAs for such long periods, the parties were (and remain)
mindful that economic circumstances may change significantly and
unexpectedly over the agreement’s lifetime. One way of dealing with
these “known unknowns”2 is to determine the GSAs’ price through a
formula rather than setting a fixed price. In addition, GSAs usually
provide for regular reviews of the price formula through the price review
clause (also referred to as price re-opener or price revision clause).
Many price review clauses use deliberately general and broad
terms that require legal and commercial interpretation.3 The
interpretation of these clauses is a topic of interest because many
European gas buyers and sellers continue to be engaged in gas price
negotiations and arbitrations. To name but a few recent examples:
• In January 2014, Germany’s RWE stated that it is “in the
middle of price negotiations with” Gazprom with the aim of a
“structural solution, which is market-based.”4 Only six
months earlier, in June 2013, an ICC tribunal had handed
down an award reducing the price in a GSA between
Gazprom and RWE, requiring Gazprom to reimburse RWE
some € 300 million for overpayments on gas purchases;5
• In March 2014, Italy’s Eni signed a final agreement with
Statoil of Norway to reduce the prices of their long-term
GSAs, cutting Eni’s costs by an estimated € 500 million;6
GSAs, cutting Eni’s costs by an estimated € 500 million;6