States often have more than simply altruistic intentions when participating in the international development regime. Decisions to vote for or against international development loans more often than not have a political element and indeed play an important role in a State's foreign policy. In honor of Professor Don Wallace, Jr., who "specializes in the fields of international law and foreign affairs,"1 this contribution examines the interdisciplinary issue of the use of international development loans to secure compliance with investment arbitration awards.
This issue should be of interest to both practitioners and scholars as foreign investors periodically allege that States fail to comply with investment treaty awards. In recent years, for example, foreign investors have criticized certain States, including Argentina, Congo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Russia, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, for purportedly refusing to pay investment arbitration awards.2 In turn, foreign investors occasionally lobby their home States to exert diplomatic pressure on allegedly recalcitrant host States. In some instances, the foreign investor receives "scant support" from his home State, such as Franz Sedelmayer in his long-running attempt to persuade the German Government to assist him in securing payment of his award