Originally from World Arbitration And Mediation Review (WAMR)

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HALL STREET ASSOCS. V. MATTEL, INC.:

SUPREME COURT DENIES ENFORCEMENT
OF AGREEMENT TO EXPAND THE
GROUNDS FOR VACATUR UNDER THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Charles H. Brower, II*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 25, 2008, the United States Supreme Court announced
its judgment in Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc.,1 a case involving
the exclusivity of the grounds for vacating arbitral awards under the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). As explained below, the decision
holds that the disputing parties may not agree to expand the grounds
for vacatur beyond those listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10. However, in
rendering its judgment, the Supreme Court left open a number of
questions, including: the capacity of judges to formulate non-statutory
grounds for vacatur; the application of the Court’s reasoning to
judicial review governed by other sources of law; and the application
of the Court’s holding to international commercial arbitrations. More
broadly, the decision may signal a departure from one trend and the
consolidation of another. For example, if applied to international
commercial arbitrations, the decision would be hard to reconcile with
recent judicial practice that favors party autonomy over doctrine and
statutes designed to restrict the exercise of party autonomy. By
contrast, the decision reinforces the Supreme Court’s tendency to
avoid broad pronouncements on commercial matters that would
require legislative fine-tuning.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Hall Street Associates (“Hall Street”) agreed to lease a
manufacturing site in Oregon to Mattel, Inc. (“Mattel”). As part of the