"Arbitracide": The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress - Chapter 10 - Carbonneau on Arbitration: Collected Essays
Thomas E. Carbonneau holds the Samuel P. Orlando Distinguished Professorship at Penn State Law and directs The Penn State Institute on Arbitration Law and Practice. In his thirty-year career in law teaching, he has taught law and arbitration at Tulane University, Fordham, McGill, University of Denver, Hamline Dispute Resolution Institute, and University of California at Davis. He is a former Editor-in-Chief of the World Arbitration and Mediation Report and is the author of nearly twenty books and numerous articles on law and arbitration. He is the faculty adviser for the Penn State Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and its Vis Moot Court team.
Originally From: Carbonneau on Arbitration: Collected Essays
I. INTRODUCTION: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND ARBITRATION
There is no mistaking the force and direction of the federal judicial policy on arbitration.1 For more than forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has touted the recourse to arbitration;2 more specifically, it has protected arbitration from inhospitable state regulation,3 contract challenge based on formation deficiencies,4 and subject matter limitations on its scope of application.5 In more than forty decisional provounements,6 the Court altered significant parts7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),8 the governing statute, to make it the repository of an unwavering judicial policy in favor of arbitration. While the "edifice"9 of doctrine was periodically rendered unsteady by the Court's makeshift analytical inventions,10 its rulings on arbitration have always been characterized by an unshakable positivistic end. With the exception of an isolated case,11 the judicial doctrine on arbitration constantly endeavors to achieve the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards12 and thereby erect and maintain a de facto, albeit functional, private process for the adjudication of civil disputes.13
Chapter 10. "Arbitracide": The Story of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress
I. Introduction: The U.S. Supreme Court and Arbitration
II. Disparate-Party Arbitration
III. Golden State Animosity
IV. The Weapon of Legislation
V. The Latest Legislative Instrument
VI. The Findings
VII. A General Assessment of the Findings
VIII. The Change to the FAA
IX. The Sessions Bill
X. Recent Developments
XI. Conclusion