



## Security Council

Distr.: General  
5 March 2004

Original: English

---

### **Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1320 (2000) of 15 September 2000, and provides an update on developments in the peace process since my report dated 19 December 2003 (S/2003/1186). The report also describes the deployment and activities of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), whose current mandate expires on 15 March 2004, and gives an account of the efforts of my Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea.

#### **II. Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea**

2. In my letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2004/102), I informed the Council of my decision to appoint Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada, as my Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea to explore with the two Governments how best the current impasse in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement could be overcome. I emphasized that the offer of good offices was not intended to create a new or alternative mechanism. In my exchanges with the parties, I also emphasized that my initiative would focus on the implementation of the Algiers Agreement, the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council, and help the parties to create a mutually advantageous situation, through dialogue and improved relations. The Security Council expressed full support for the mission of good offices (see S/2004/103).

3. In the second half of February, my Special Envoy carried out his initial mission to the region. In Addis Ababa, he consulted with the Ethiopian leadership and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union. He held further consultations in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including consultations with the current Chairman of the African Union. My Special Envoy's intended visit to Asmara did not materialize because of the negative disposition of the Government of Eritrea towards his mission.

### **III. Status of the Temporary Security Zone and adjacent areas**

4. During the period under review, the general situation in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas remained relatively stable, and there were no major incidents. UNMEE believes however that, in the absence of progress on the demarcation of the border, this stability must be considered as fragile. In order to maintain the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone, UNMEE carried out extensive and continuous patrolling in the Zone, monitored the redeployed positions of the parties' armed forces in the adjacent areas, and observed the activities of the Eritrean militia and police in and around the Zone. Regrettably, overall cooperation with the parties on the ground has shown signs of gradual deterioration over the last few months.

5. UNMEE continued to observe an increase in training activities, in particular by the Ethiopian Armed Forces, which have frequently been conducted in close proximity to the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone. UNMEE has requested the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence and the commanders of the Ethiopian divisions involved to move their training activities away from the Zone. Meanwhile, routine maintenance work on defence positions on both sides of the Zone continued.

6. The incursions by Ethiopian herdsmen and their livestock into the Temporary Security Zone in Sector Centre, mentioned in previous reports, decreased marginally, and incidents of armed Ethiopian militia accompanying them have all but ceased. Meanwhile, there was an increase in allegations by both parties of rustling of livestock in Sectors West and Centre. At the same time, several exchanges of livestock were successfully arranged with the assistance of UNMEE, both sides returning livestock that had either strayed or been stolen. On 19 January, an unarmed patrol of UNMEE military observers travelling at night was fired upon, after failing to stop at a temporary Ethiopian Armed Forces checkpoint in Sector West. Three rounds were fired, and a single bullet hit one of the vehicles, but no one was injured. The UNMEE investigation, which was carried out with the full cooperation of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, revealed that the patrol had failed to stop because it was night-time and it had not seen the temporary checkpoint, and that the soldier who had opened fire had been unable to identify the vehicles, which did not have illuminated flags. UNMEE lodged a formal protest about the shooting with the Ministry of Defence, which regretted its occurrence and promised that such incidents would not reoccur.

7. In a worrying incident, UNMEE Sector West headquarters in Barentu in Eritrea was targeted by a hand-delivered improvised explosive device on 20 January. Fortunately, it caused no casualties and only little damage. UNMEE was unable to determine the identity of the perpetrators, and is still awaiting the results of the Eritrean investigation. As a result of the incident, the Mission has requested the local Eritrean authorities to increase security in the vicinity of that facility.

8. During the period under review, a number of military personnel and civilians from both sides defected across the southern boundary of the Temporary Security Zone. While UNMEE is not mandated to halt such illegal crossings, all reported incidents were thoroughly investigated. On several occasions, the Mission facilitated the prompt repatriation of individuals who had accidentally crossed the boundary from either side and were detained by the respective authorities. UNMEE assets, in particular vehicles, are at risk of being commandeered or otherwise put to

unauthorized use for the purpose of crossing the southern boundary of the Zone. An UNMEE vehicle was reported missing in Asmara on 6 January and was found abandoned in Addis Ababa on 13 January. As a result of that incident, the two parties cited serious national security concerns, the Government of Ethiopia demanding a forensic examination of the vehicle and photographic identification of the person or persons who had made unauthorized use of the vehicle, as well as a joint investigation with the Mission. UNMEE discussed the matter extensively with the Ethiopian authorities, and agreed to have the vehicle inspected by the Government in the presence of UNMEE personnel, but was not in a position to provide photographic identification of the driver and the passengers. An investigation of the incident is under way.

### **Freedom of movement**

9. On 2 February, Ethiopia severely restricted the Mission's freedom of movement, as it closed all major roads and tracks leading into Ethiopia, with the exception of the Mereb River crossing in Sector Centre. The restrictions, which were imposed as a result of the incident described in the previous paragraph, were mostly lifted after 48 hours, following UNMEE protests to the Government of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian authorities continued to impose restrictions at Humera Bridge in Sector West until 19 February, when they were removed.

10. On the Eritrean side, UNMEE faced continuing restrictions on its movements in the areas adjacent to, and on a number of occasions within, the Temporary Security Zone. UNMEE has repeatedly protested about these restrictions to the Eritrean authorities, which maintain that the Mission's monitoring mandate is limited solely to the Zone and does not include the redeployment positions of its armed forces outside the Zone. As a result, the Mission's ability to monitor the redeployment positions of the Eritrean Defence Forces in the adjacent areas, in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, is severely constrained.

11. Regrettably, there has been no improvement with regard to the difficulties experienced by UNMEE staff at the airports in Addis Ababa and Asmara when entering and leaving Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Government of Eritrea continues, furthermore, to insist on receiving prior notification for non-Mission passengers travelling on UNMEE carriers on both domestic and cross-border flights, a requirement which unnecessarily hampers humanitarian and political efforts in support of the peace process, as it affects the United Nations country team, representatives of the diplomatic community, troop-contributing countries and other stakeholders. It should be emphasized that UNMEE transport of non-Mission passengers does not circumvent in any way compliance with the relevant immigration procedures.

12. Despite repeated requests and efforts, UNMEE aircraft are still required, three and a half years after the Mission's inception, to travel via Djibouti when flying between Addis Ababa and Asmara. While Ethiopia has indicated that it may now be willing to allow direct flights, it has not followed through with a decision or action to this effect. In the meantime, the failure of the parties to overcome their differences on this issue continues to necessitate longer, more complicated and less secure flights. The indirect flights have also resulted in additional costs totalling over US\$ 3.14 million since the Mission's establishment, as well as in countless wasted work hours for UNMEE personnel flying between the two capitals. I once

again appeal to the parties to allow for the resolution of this matter. The introduction of direct flights would be a significant improvement for UNMEE staff working for peace in the two countries, and could also contribute to much-needed confidence-building.

#### **Military Coordination Commission**

13. UNMEE continued to convene and chair the Military Coordination Commission, which held its 21st and 22nd meetings in Nairobi on 15 December 2003 and 2 February 2004, respectively. At those meetings it dealt in detail with the modalities for the conduct of sector-level military coordination commissions. At the latter meeting, the two parties endorsed a framework for sector military coordination commissions and set dates early in March for the first meetings in each sector, in time for them to report back to the Military Coordination Commission when it meets again on 15 March in Nairobi. The first meeting of the sector Military Coordination Commissions was held on the Mereb River Bridge in Sector Centre on 3 March, and the other two sectors are due to hold meetings later in the month. I very much welcome this development and hope that the establishment of the sector-level commissions will lead to enhanced cooperation between military commanders and help to build more trust between the parties and address security issues at the local level. Regrettably, there has been no progress with regard to holding future meetings of the Military Coordination Commission alternately in the capitals of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

#### **Status of the Mission and related issues**

14. As at 26 February 2004, the total strength of the UNMEE military component stood at 4,016, comprising 3,690 troops, 112 headquarters staff officers, and 214 military observers (see annex II).

15. I appeal once again to the Government of Eritrea to sign the status-of-forces agreement with the United Nations without further delay. The model status-of-forces agreement continues to be in effect in the interim. The Eritrean authorities continue to impose national service obligations on UNMEE local staff members, in contravention of the model status-of-forces agreement and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. My Special Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, continues to pursue and protest about the matter, including the detention by the Government of some local staff on the basis of national service obligations. It is to be recalled that Ethiopia signed the status-of-forces agreement with the United Nations in March 2001.

16. In accordance with the Secretary-General's bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13), UNMEE identified a focal point to receive complaints on sexual exploitation and harassment. In addition, in an effort to promote gender awareness, UNMEE has incorporated a module on gender awareness into the ongoing training programmes for both its civilian and its military personnel. The awareness campaign to promote gender sensitivity within the Mission is ongoing.

17. Owing to the recently announced plans of the Government of Eritrea to upgrade a nearby airstrip, UNMEE has been requested to relocate its established military and other facilities in Barentu to a new site eight kilometres from the town. This relocation, which is expected to be done at considerable cost to the

Organization and which involves both administrative offices and military camps, commenced on 19 January and is expected to be completed by the end of March. On a separate issue, UNMEE and the Secretariat are currently reviewing the overall security of the Mission's facilities.

#### **IV. Boundary Commission**

18. It is a matter of deep concern that since my last report there has been no progress in the demarcation of the border. Nevertheless, the Boundary Commission has kept its field offices open with minimal staffing in anticipation of a quick resumption of its work. UNMEE continued to provide administrative and logistical support to those offices. A report of the Commission, prepared by its President, is contained in annex I to the present report.

19. Voluntary contributions and pledges to the Trust Fund for delimitation and demarcation of the border currently total some \$10.9 million. Owing to the delay in demarcation, it is now projected that an additional \$6 million will be required to complete the demarcation of the whole border, when the process resumes.

#### **V. Mine action**

20. Landmines and unexploded ordnance remain a major threat in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas. From December 2003 to mid-February 2004, there were six incidents involving landmines and unexploded ordnance, four in Sector West and two in Sector Centre. Three people were killed in those incidents and seven seriously injured. The Mission's preliminary investigations indicated that the incidents were not the result of newly laid mines; in fact, there have been no incidents involving newly laid mines since July 2003. Meanwhile, UNMEE demining assets continued their work throughout the Mission area, destroying 314 mines and 356 items of unexploded ordnance, and clearing more than 686,940 m<sup>2</sup> of land and 544 km of road.

#### **VI. Humanitarian developments**

21. The New Coalition for Livelihood and Food Security in Ethiopia, formed in mid-2003 and composed of the Government, United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations, has been seeking to address medium- to long-term food insecurity in an attempt to break the cycle of persistent emergency and need for humanitarian response. The key areas of the programme include the design of safety nets to protect lives and assist the most vulnerable; capacity-building and institutional arrangements; social mobilization mechanisms; and a monitoring and evaluation system. A transition from humanitarian programmes to initiatives of the New Coalition for the chronic food-insecure population (some 4 to 5 million people) will begin during 2004. In the meantime, the Government and its partners intend to work to ensure that the basic needs of the full caseload of those in need (estimated to be some 7.2 million) will be met during the year.

22. The Government of Eritrea and the United Nations country team have also made significant progress in several key areas in an effort to elevate the country

from its current humanitarian emergency. The efforts include the development of an integrated recovery programme based on medium- and long-term needs, which is awaiting the Government's approval; a food security strategy; an interim poverty reduction strategy paper; and a contingency plan for internally displaced persons and host communities expected to be affected by the demarcation of the border.

23. Since early January, all United Nations agencies, international organizations and embassies operating in Eritrea require travel permits for any travel outside of the four main routes, from Asmara to Massawa, Mendefera (Adi Ugri) and Keren, and from Dek'emhare/Nefasit to Massawa. Applications for the travel permits have to be submitted 10 days in advance. The United Nations country team remains concerned that this new regulation may hamper its ability to implement and monitor projects and to respond quickly. Discussions between the United Nations country team and the Government of Eritrea are ongoing.

24. In view of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Eritrea and Ethiopia, I urge all donors to continue to respond generously to the recent appeals to address the emergency needs of the populations in both countries.

#### **Quick-impact projects**

25. UNMEE continued to implement quick-impact projects in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas of Ethiopia and Eritrea. A total of 88 projects have now been completed, and another 41 projects are in various stages of implementation. The quick-impact projects Committee has reviewed a number of additional projects, but funds contributed to the Trust Fund to Support the Peace Process in Ethiopia and Eritrea have almost been depleted. The Mission has found that quick-impact projects do make a considerable difference to the lives of Eritreans and Ethiopians residing in the border areas, and I urge donors to continue to support this important programme through additional contributions to the Trust Fund.

#### **HIV/AIDS activities**

26. UNMEE continued to promote HIV/AIDS awareness among the Mission's peacekeeping personnel. Training-of-trainers courses in HIV/AIDS peer leadership continued jointly with the armed forces of the host nations and other sections of the population, particularly religious groups, hotel staff, youth representatives, and commercial sex workers. During the reporting period, UNMEE trained 92 peer educators and also carried out campaigns promoting HIV/AIDS awareness among the host population.

## **VII. Human rights**

27. Since my last report, UNMEE has undertaken a thorough review of its human rights mandate, assessing the possibility of including human rights promotion and technical cooperation. It is a cause of concern, however, that neither party has responded to requests from my Special Representative concerning the implementation of the Mission's human rights mandate. Despite two written requests, UNMEE has still not been allowed to visit a camp of Eritrean asylum-seekers near Shiraro, Ethiopia. Similarly, there has been no response to a letter dated 9 January 2004 addressed to the authorities requesting access to Eritrean detention

centres. That request was made in order to verify the application of minimum standards concerning the treatment of detainees, in accordance with international human rights conventions, which Eritrea ratified. The detainees include persons of Ethiopian origin arrested in Eritrea, and individuals arrested within the Temporary Security Zone after crossing the southern boundary of the Zone.

28. During the period under review, UNMEE conducted interviews with persons of Ethiopian origin repatriated by Eritrea on 19 December 2003 under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who included many elderly persons and young children. The interviews gave UNMEE grounds for concern with respect to the treatment of those persons by the Eritrean security and immigration officials. Another area of concern was the denial of access to Eritrean asylum-seekers, particularly minors, on their arrival in Ethiopia, as a result of a reported change in policy on the part of the authorities. At the same time, in January 2004, the Government of Ethiopia issued a directive stating that Eritrean residents of Ethiopia could apply for citizenship; further clarification is being sought concerning that directive.

29. UNMEE continued to conduct human rights training for its peacekeepers. It is worth noting that human rights training could be extended to national partners, including law enforcement officials and judicial bodies, as well as to women's and other associations in both countries. Participation by those officials and members of such bodies in such training activities would however imply not only the support of the respective parties for the work of the UNMEE human rights office but also additional financial support.

## **VIII. Public information**

30. The Mission continued to disseminate information about the peace process and the work of UNMEE by a number of different means. However, the closure in September 2003 of the UNMEE outreach centres in Eritrea has created a vacuum in the information flow from the Mission within Eritrea, which the Mission is trying to address through different means. Meanwhile, the two outreach centres on the Ethiopian side continue to be popular, and there has been a substantial increase in monthly visits. In an effort that particularly targets audiences in the border areas, UNMEE has prepared a pilot series on issues of interest to the border communities in both countries, including gender issues, conflict resolution and the values of cooperation and good-neighbourliness. In view of the success of the UNMEE 2003 art calendar, the Mission has produced a new calendar for 2004, featuring the 12 winning entries in a children's painting competition conducted in the two countries, the theme of which was peace. So far, some 12,000 copies of the calendar have been distributed to the Ethiopian and Eritrean public.

## **IX. Financial aspects**

31. The General Assembly, by its resolution 57/328 of 18 June 2003, appropriated the amount of \$188.4 million (gross), equivalent to \$15.7 million per month, for the maintenance of UNMEE for the financial period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission. Should the Security Council decide to extend

the mandate of UNMEE beyond 15 March 2004, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2004 would be limited to the monthly amounts approved by the General Assembly. As at 31 January 2004, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNMEE amounted to \$81.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$2.2 billion.

## **X. Observations**

32. There have been no major incidents on the ground since my last report, as the armed forces of both parties remain separated by the Temporary Security Zone and generally continue to respect their security commitments. According to the Mission's assessment, however, in the absence of political progress military stability is becoming fragile and should not be taken for granted. The current stalemate is a source of instability and therefore has the potential to become dangerous. Indeed, recent Eritrean statements have indicated that the present impasse could have serious consequences, with high human cost and far-reaching implications for regional peace and security. I would like, once again, to remind the parties of their commitment, set out in the Algiers Agreement, to permanently terminate military hostilities and refrain from the threat or use of force against each other.

33. It is clear that the main reason for the present stalemate in the peace process, which had otherwise progressed in an exemplary fashion, is the lack of progress in the demarcation of the border. The establishment of an internationally recognized border has long been considered essential to a lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the creation of the Boundary Commission was therefore a central element of the Algiers Agreement of December 2000. The importance of implementing the decision of the Boundary Commission was reinforced on numerous occasions by the Security Council, most recently in its President's statement to the press on 7 January 2004, and in subsequent statements by the United States as well as the witnesses of the Algiers Agreement. I therefore regret the rejection by Ethiopia contained in the letter to me from the Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, dated 19 September 2003, of significant parts of the Boundary Commission's decision, which it had accepted as final and binding. In order to keep the peace process on track, it would be very helpful if Ethiopia would restate unequivocally its support for the Boundary Commission's decision and demonstrate its commitment to the demarcation process by allowing it to proceed. Concrete steps in this regard would include reconfirmation of its acceptance of the decision of the Boundary Commission as final and binding, payment of its dues to the Commission, appointment of field liaison officers, and allowing preparatory work to commence in Sectors West and Centre.

34. At the same time, I strongly believe that the simultaneous establishment of a channel of communication will help to facilitate the efforts to build trust, normalize relations and implement the Algiers Agreement. I was therefore saddened by Eritrea's decision not to receive my Special Envoy during his recent first visit to the region. The outcome of any dialogue will depend on the input of both parties, and neither should fear that an exchange of views, through my Special Envoy, will undermine their positions or earlier agreements. The appointment of the Special Envoy was indeed intended to provide an opportunity for both parties to present their positions and ideas on how to move the process forward. Moreover, as the



stability of the military situation is sometimes questioned, the need for communication has become even more important. I reiterate my strong appeal to the two parties, in particular to Eritrea, to give my Special Envoy the opportunity to meet and discuss with their leadership how best my good offices could help them to overcome the impasse in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement. Obviously, both he and I are open to any constructive interaction with both parties.

35. The continuing stalemate in the peace process also raises questions about the future of UNMEE, which was established to help to create conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of the conflict through the delimitation and demarcation of the border. The peacekeeping operation was never meant to support a status quo indefinitely. The resources, troops and goodwill of the international community currently consumed by UNMEE could without any doubt be used elsewhere, not least in other parts of Africa where demand for urgent assistance is still great. In view of the ongoing efforts of my Special Envoy and the continuing distrust between the parties, it would be premature at present to suggest any major changes to the configuration of UNMEE. It is my belief that the benchmarks for any reduction of the peacekeeping operation should be based on an easing rather than a heightening of tension on the ground, and must be driven by change for the better in mutual trust and confidence. Possible benchmarks for this process would include an improvement in the security environment, well-functioning sector military coordination commissions which actively cooperate to resolve practical problems as they arise, and meaningful progress in demarcation. I will monitor the situation closely in this regard and will stand ready to make specific recommendations as the situation evolves. In particular, the Mission's effectiveness will be kept under close review to adjust and streamline operations as needed. In the meantime, I believe UNMEE should continue to carry out its essential mandate, which I recommend be extended for an additional period of six months, until 15 September 2004.

36. In view of the heightening tensions, it is more important than ever for UNMEE to be able to carry out its key role, namely, monitoring the Temporary Security Zone as well as the redeployed positions of the armed forces of the two sides, as specified in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 2000 and as mandated by the Security Council in resolution 1320 (2000). It is therefore both urgent and critical that the two parties extend their complete cooperation with UNMEE and allow its personnel full freedom of movement in the Temporary Security Zone and the adjacent areas.

37. At the same time, I am heartened by the fact that, despite the lack of progress in recent months, the international community has remained actively engaged and supportive of this peace process. I believe that this persistence is in part the result of a wish to witness and contribute to the successful conclusion of a peace process which has come so far and in which so much has been invested. The continuing political, financial and other support of all international partners for the peace process will remain crucial. It is critical that the international community remain united and speak with one voice in support of the mission of my Special Envoy. However, no one can do more to bring about lasting peace in this region than the parties themselves. For the sake of their own peoples, and in recognition of the great contribution of the international community, I urge the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea to take concrete and decisive steps to move the process forward and to its early conclusion.

38. In conclusion, I wish to recognize the persistent and hard work of my Special Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, and the military and civilian personnel of UNMEE, as well as the efforts of the United Nations country teams and their humanitarian partners on the ground. I also wish to thank Lloyd Axworthy for accepting the challenging assignment as my Special Envoy and for his efforts thus far. Finally, the United Nations remains grateful to all its key partners, Member States, the African Union and other international organizations which continue to lend their invaluable support to the United Nations effort in bringing lasting peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

## Annex I

### **Twelfth report on the work of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission**

1. This is the twelfth report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, covering the period from 1 December 2003 to 26 February 2004.
2. As indicated in its eleventh report, the Commission has, regrettably, and for reasons beyond its control, been unable to progress with demarcation activities. The Commission is unaware of any developments during the period currently under review that would cause it to revise its conclusion that, until the positions of either or both of the parties are modified, there is nothing more that the Commission can do.
3. The Commission has noted the appointment by the Secretary-General of Lloyd Axworthy as his Special Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea, to explore with the two Governments “how best the current impasse in the implementation of the Algiers Agreement could be overcome”. The Commission has also noted that the offer by the Secretary-General of his good offices is not intended to represent a new or alternative mechanism.
4. In keeping with its undertaking to continue — if the parties cooperate fully — in the manner foreseen in the Algiers Agreement, the Commission is maintaining its presence in the area, but has reduced its activity to the minimum compatible with its being able to resume it, if and when the parties make it possible for the Commission to do so. To this end, it is maintaining its field offices in both capitals with reduced staff.
5. It must nevertheless be recalled that, although contractors for pillar emplacement and as-built survey have been selected, their actual deployment in the field requires four months of preparation time.
6. The Special Consultant continued to provide monthly progress reports to the parties through the Secretary during this period. The meeting of the Boundary Commission with the parties in The Hague on 19 November was noted in the progress report of November 2003. According to the December 2003 and January 2004 progress reports, as the parties “have not made it possible for the Commission to resume its activity, no progress was made ... and there is nothing to report”.
7. Under article 4, paragraph 17, of the Algiers Agreement, the parties are required to bear the expenses of the Commission in equal shares, and deposits are accordingly required from the parties at regular intervals. Eritrea has paid its latest deposit, while Ethiopia, despite repeated reminders, has not. Accordingly the Commission has been unable to make payment on certain accrued expenses, and has no funds in hand to finance any renewed activity.

(Signed) Sir Elihu **Lauterpacht**  
President of the Commission  
27 February 2004

## Annex II

**United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea: contributions as  
at 27 February 2004**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>National support elements</i>
Algeria	8			<b>8</b>	
Australia			2	<b>2</b>	
Austria	2		1	<b>3</b>	
Bangladesh	7	168	4	<b>179</b>	
Benin			2	<b>2</b>	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	9			<b>9</b>	
Bulgaria	5		2	<b>7</b>	
China	6			<b>6</b>	
Croatia	7			<b>7</b>	
Czech Republic	2			<b>2</b>	
Denmark	4			<b>4</b>	
Finland	7	185	12	<b>204</b>	
France			1	<b>1</b>	
Gambia	5		2	<b>7</b>	
Ghana	11		6	<b>17</b>	
Germany	2			<b>2</b>	
Greece	3			<b>3</b>	
India	7	1 524	19	<b>1 550</b>	
Iran, Islamic Republic of	3			<b>3</b>	
Italy		43	1	<b>44</b>	8
Jordan	7	945	15	<b>967</b>	
Kenya	11	664	12	<b>687</b>	
Malaysia	7		4	<b>11</b>	
Namibia	4		1	<b>5</b>	
Nepal	5			<b>5</b>	
Nigeria	6		4	<b>10</b>	
Norway	5			<b>5</b>	
Paraguay	3			<b>3</b>	
Peru	3			<b>3</b>	
Poland	6			<b>6</b>	
Romania	8			<b>8</b>	
Russian Federation	6			<b>6</b>	
Slovakia		129	2	<b>131</b>	
Spain	3		2	<b>5</b>	

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Staff</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>National support elements</i>
South Africa	3		5	<b>8</b>	
Sweden	6			<b>6</b>	
Switzerland	4			<b>4</b>	
Tunisia	2		3	<b>5</b>	
Ukraine	7			<b>7</b>	
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1		2	<b>3</b>	1
United Republic of Tanzania	8		3	<b>11</b>	
Uruguay	5	32	3	<b>40</b>	
United States of America	7			<b>7</b>	
Zambia	9		4	<b>13</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>3 690</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>4 016</b>	<b>9</b>